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CLARENCE THOMAS: EVASIVE OR DECEPTIVE
ANTON BELL*
."[T]rust me, my mind is open, I don't have a position or even an
opinion on the issue of abortion."
Senator Howard Metzenbaum quoting Clarence Thomas
Senate Confirmation Hearings, 19911
INTRODUCTION
The Date: September 10, 1991.
The Event: One of this nation's most heated debates.
The Place: The United States Senate.
The Players: Clarence Thomas, Anita Hill, the members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, and the media.
The Issue: Whether to confirm Clarence Thomas as the next
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
Few debates in American history have generated such controversy
as the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings on
Clarence Thomas' fitness for the position of Associate Justice of the
United States Supreme Court.2 From the moment President George
Bush3 announced Thomas' nomination on July 1, 1991, division4 and
confusion erupted. Many civil rights leaders and organizations (e.g.,
Jesse Jackson,5 the National Association for the Advancement of
* B.A., Political Science, Norfolk State University; J.D., North Carolina Central Univer-
sity School of Law, 1995. Mr. Bell is currently practicing in Virginia.
1. Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings on S. 1084 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 462 (1991) (statement of Senator Howard Metzenbaum quoting Clarence Thomas) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings].
2. Robert Christman and Robert L. Allen, COURT OF APPEAL: Tim BLACK COMMUNITY
SPEAKS OUT ON THE RACIAL AND SEXUAL POLITICS OF CLARENCE THOMAS Vs. ANITA HILL Xi
(1992) [hereinafter COURT OF APPEAL].
3. See Acel Moore, Bush Must Believe In Quotas When It Comes to The Supreme Court,
PILADELPMA INQUIRER, July 9, 1991, at A17 (alleging Thomas' nomination may have been the
result of his race rather than his qualifications).
4. See Karen Dewitt, A.C.L.U. To Remain Neutral On Nomination of Thomas, N.Y.
TuMS, Aug. 19, 1991, at A10.
5. See Roberto Suro, Thomas Smoked Marijuana but Retains Bush Support; Jackson
Assails Thomas, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1991, at A17.
1
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Colored People,6 and the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation7)
opposed the nominee because of his ultra-conservative views.8 On the
other hand, some African-Americans (e.g., Maya Angelou 9 and
members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference10 ), as well
as liberal whites, supported Thomas because of his race.
Nevertheless, the controversy that surrounded the nomination of
Clarence Thomas only proved to be a mere sample of what was to
follow during the confirmation hearings.
Throughout Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, his struggle
to obtain approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee proved to be
extremely difficult and, at times, embarrassing." During the hearings,
Thomas had to justify his public record.12 Moreover, in an effort to
rehabilitate his character, Justice Thomas had to defend himself
against charges of sexual harassment. 3 However, despite all of the
obstacles that were placed before him, Clarence Thomas emerged as
the victor. He was confirmed as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, albeit by the narrowest margin in modern history.' 4 The key
question, however, still remained: Was Clarence Thomas indeed the
6. See Steven A. Holmes, N.A.A.C.P. Report Faults Thomas' View On Equality Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1991 (criticizing Judge Thomas on comments regarding racial issues). See
also The N.A.A.C.P. Announces Opposition to Judge Thomas' Nomination (reprinted in COURT
OF APPEAL, supra note 2, at 269); Steven A. Holmes, The N.A.A.C.P. Votes No, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 1991, sec. 4 at 7.
7. See Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, In Opposition to Clarence Thomas: Where
We Must Stand and Why (reprinted in COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 2, at 231). See also Richard
L. Berke, Black Caucus Votes To Oppose Thomas For High Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1991, at Al.
8. See Scott D. Gerber, The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 8 J.L. AND POL. 107 (1991)
(offering an interesting analysis of Justice Thomas' pre-nomination jurisprudence). See also
Clarence Thomas, No Room At The Inn; The Loneliness of the Black Conservative, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION POL'Y REV. at 72 (1991) (commenting on the criticism and anger directed towards
him for being a black conservative).
9. See Maya Angelou, I Dare To Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, sec. 4 at 15 (expressing
her optimism that Thomas would change his conservative views once he was confirmed as a
Justice).
10. See Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, The SCLC Position: Confirm Clarence Thomas (reprinted in
COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 2, at 283) (expressing his support for Thomas because of his
race).
11. See Jill Abramson & David Shribman, Sex Harassment Jeopardizes Thomas,
Embarrasses Politicians, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1991, at Al (presenting accounts of sexual
harassment charges by Anita Hill).
12. See Neil A. Lewis, The Thomas Hearings; Thomas Undergoes Tough Questioning on
Past Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1991, at Al, A21 (questioning Thomas about his remarks on
abortion).
13. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 36 (Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment). See
also James Rowley, Senate Delays Thomas Vote for a Week to Study Charges, L.A. DAILY J., Oct.
9, 1991, at 1.
14. The margin was 52-48. See Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas: First Term, First
Impressions, 35 How. L.J. 115, 118 (1992) [hereinafter Gerber, First Term]. See also 137 CONG.
REc. S14, at 704-05 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991).
2
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most "qualified person" to succeed Justice Thurgood Marshall, 5 one
of the most zealous advocates of civil liberties? 16 Justice Marshall had
indeed set the standard for every jurist of African descent.
Commentators have noted that Justice Thomas may not meet this
standard with only four years of experience on the High Court.
17
Part I of this comment will present a brief biography of Clarence
Thomas. This section will discuss his academic achievements as well
as his social and political experiences. Part I will also examine
Thomas' key mentor, Senator John Danforth, who has molded the
nominee into what he has become today, one of the most conservative
Justices on the United States Supreme Court.
18
Part II of this comment will analyze the testimony of Clarence
Thomas during the Senate confirmation hearings. It will focus on six
areas of importance: natural law, abortion, voting rights, affirmative
action, prisoners' rights and sexual harassment. This section will next
examine Thomas' views (as expressed or implied during his
testimony) in comparison to past speeches and statements (i.e., his
public record) he made while holding other governmental or judicial
positions (Assistant Secretary in the Department of Education,
Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
[hereinafter EEOC] and a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit).
Part III of this comment will continue with a review of United
States Supreme Court decisions in which Justice Thomas has
participated and voted. A comparison of the decisions will follow.
Finally, Part IV of this comment will conclude with an assessment of
Justice Thomas' credibility during the confirmation process. This
section will present to the reader one question: Whether Clarence
Thomas adequately answered the Senate's inquiries.
15. See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23-32
(1991) (referring to Justice Marshall as "probably the most important advocate in America, one
who used his formidable skills to end the evils of discrimination"). See also Jesse Jackson,
Thurgood Marshall Commemorative Issue: Justice Thurgood Marshall: The Struggle Personified,
34 How. L.J. 73 (1991) (giving a retrospective view of the achievements of Justice Marshall).
16. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (criticizing the Framers of the Constitution for creating a
government that excluded minorities, i.e., blacks and women, from participating in government
affairs, e.g., voting).
17. See Aaron Epstein, Thomas And Marshall: Views Are Worlds Apart, MIAMI HERALD,
July 2, 1991, at Al (noting that the two Justices differed in their views on race relations and civil
rights law, despite their similar experience with racism).
18. See Acel Moore, Thomas Has Left Little Doubt Now; Put Him On the Right With Scalia,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 27, 1992, at A19 (noting that Thomas' votes on the Court
indicate his ideological preference). See also Gordon Crovitz, Justice Scalia's Ally on the Court-
And Then Some, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1992, at A15; Paul Barrett and Arthur S. Hayes, Law:
Thomas Displays A Conservative Stance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1992, at B9 (suggesting that
Justice Thomas has allied himself with the dominant conservative bloc).
3
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PART I - CLARENCE THOMAS: THE MAN BEFORE THE NOMINATION
Clarence Thomas, a product of a poverty-stricken community, was
born and raised by his grandparents in Pin Point, Georgia.19 Through-
out his primary education, he attended segregated parochial schools.
It was not until he entered Holy Cross College that he experienced
social interaction with white students. Following his graduation from
Holy Cross, Thomas was accepted into Yale University School of Law.
At that time, the University was aggressively recruiting minority stu-
dents to attend its school (i.e., an affirmative action program). 20 At
Yale, Clarence Thomas made many business contacts which became
useful to him later in his legal career.
For example, Justice Thomas' contacts included then Missouri State
Attorney John Danforth, who hired Thomas immediately after he
completed his studies at Yale. Thomas later joined Senator Dan-
forth's staff as a legislative assistant in the United States Senate.
Although the two colleagues eventually parted professionally, they
still kept in frequent contact with one another. Senator Danforth be-
came Justice Thomas' mentor, molding and guiding him through the
hierarchy of governmental posts. In fact, throughout the entire confir-
mation process, Senator Danforth's support was immeasurable in as-
sisting Justice Thomas in acquiring his present position on the Court.
21
Following his departure from Yale, Clarence Thomas began his
climb through the government ranks. Before acquiring his present po-
sition as an Associate Justice on the United States Supreme Court, he
held the following positions: Assistant Attorney General in the State
of Missouri; legislative assistant to Senator John Danforth; Assistant
Secretary in the Department of Education; Chairman of EEOC; and a
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit. These positions brought Justice Thomas both prestige
and power. They also gave him the opportunity to voice his opinion
about many issues, namely affirmative action and abortion. These
views, however, later would come to haunt the nominee throughout
his confirmation.22
19. Hearings, supra note 1, at 83, 108-09 (Justice Thomas' entire biography, as noted
throughout Part I, was supplied by his opening statement to the Judicial Committee during the
confirmation hearings).
20. Id. at 108, 250-51.
21. See Gerber, First Term, supra note 14, at 118 (lobbying by Senator Danforth for
Thomas' confirmation).
22. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 177-86 (Senator Metzenbaum alerted Justice Thomas to
the fact that he did have a record on, among other things, the issues of abortion and affirmative
action). See also Viveca Novak, Doubting Thomas, 250 NATION 405 (1990); Juan A. Williams, A
Question of Fairness, 259 At.wArc MomHLx 70 (1987).
4
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PART II - CONFIRMATION VIEWS
During the confirmation hearings, Justice Thomas was repeatedly
asked to comment on views he had expressed on several earlier occa-
sions. Senators persistently asked the nominee to explain or elaborate
on his statements concerning natural law, abortion, voting rights, af-
firmative action, prisoners' rights and sexual harassment. Justice
Thomas' answers at time were found unsatisfactory.23 Some commen-
tators found that his answers were sometimes off-point, the issue was
side-stepped,24 or the response was in direct contrast to statements
previously made during his tenure as Chairman of the EEOC.25
Throughout the hearings, Justice Thomas portrayed himself as "some-
one other than the often strident and controversial figure he had been
in the Reagan and Bush administrations."26 Critics found that the
nominee dismissed parts of his professional record as being irrelevant
to his judicial performance. 27 On other occasions, they found he dis-
credited his record by claiming that he was ill-advised or even igno-
rant of the contents of certain documents that he had endorsed.2 At
other times, they found that Justice Thomas characterized parts of his
public record as statements (advocating or criticizing certain views/
persons) that were either taken out of context or made with an ulte-
rior purpose in stark contrast to the specific intent that was
expressed.
29
23. See Hearings, supra note 1. See also Aaron Epstein, Judiciary Panel Presses Thomas to
State His Views, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 1991, at A15 (confronting Thomas on his views con-
cerning abortion and natural law). Examples of Justice Thomas' inconsistent statements made
during the confirmation hearings will be discussed later in this comment.
24. See Hearings, supra note 1. See also Paul M. Barrett, Democrats Charge Thomas Is
Evasive, Willing To Discuss Anything But Abortion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at A12.
25. See Hearings, supra text accompanying note 1. See also Paul M. Barrett, Democrats
Accuse Thomas of Changing Positions To Win Confirmation As Justice, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12,
1991, at A20 (suggesting that Justice Thomas separated himself from his conservative stance in
hopes of winning confirmation).
26. Michael Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation
of Clarence Thomas, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 969, 980 (1992) (noting that the nomination and
eventual confirmation of Thomas were the result of a mixture of race and politics).
27. Id.
28. Hearings, supra note 1, at 219.
29. See Clarence Thomas, Why Black Conservatives Should Look to Conservative Policies,
Speech to Heritage Foundation (June 18, 1987) [hereinafter Thomas, Why Black Conservatives].
See also Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARv. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 63 (1989) [hereinafter Thomas, Higher
Law Background].
5
Bell: Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995
1995] CLARENCE THOMAS. EVASIVE OR DECEPTIVE 199
A. Natural Law30
When asked to explain a statement he made concerning natural law,
Clarence Thomas responded that he was interested in the doctrine31
and that his interest in exploring natural law and natural rights was
purely in the context of political theory. The nominee noted that he
was only attracted to the doctrine's main premise: all men are created
equal (i.e., the Framers' [of the U.S. Constitution] view of the princi-
ple of liberty).32 Hence, in retrospect, Justice Thomas stressed that he
did not see any role for the application of natural law to constitutional
adjudication. 31 His position, however, was in direct contrast to prior
statements he had made concerning this area of law.
For example, during the hearings, Justice Thomas once noted, "I
have not in any speech said that we should adjudicate cases by directly
appealing to natural law."'  The nominee, however, once published
an article (during his tenure as EEOC Chairman) that read in part:
[w]ithout recourse to higher law [natural law], we abandon our best
defense of judicial review-a judiciary active in defending the Consti-
tution, but judicious in its restraint and moderation. Rather than being
a justification of the worst type of judicial activism, higher law is the
only alternative to the willfulness of both run-amok majorities and
run-amok judges.
35
In another example, Clarence Thomas remarked during a speech to
the Heritage Foundation that New York businessman Lewis Lehr-
man's essay, "The Declaration of Independence and the Right to
Life," was "a splendid example" of applying natural law in the context
of the abortion rights issue,36 thus indicating an application of natural
30. "This expression, 'natural law,' was largely used in the philosophical speculations of the
Roman jurists of the Antonine age, and was intended to denote a system of rules and principles
for the guidance of human conduct which, independently of enacted law or of the systems
peculiar to any one people, might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and would
be found to grow out of and conform to his 'nature,' meaning by that word his whole mental,
moral, and physical constitution." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1026 (6th ed. 1990). "Under
natural law, anything that goes against human dignity and reason is to be rejected." Ted Gest &
Jeffrey L. Sheler, A Higher Law For the High Court, 111 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 50
(1991) (quoting Chester Gillis, Assistant Professor of Theology at Georgetown University).
31. Hearings, supra note 1, at 112. Senator Biden quoted Judge Thomas as praising the
works of Harvard Law Professor Stephen Macedo, a staunch advocate of natural law playing a
role in constitutional adjudication. Id. See also Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution:
Toward a Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CrN. L. REv. 29 (1992).
32. Hearings, supra note 1, at 171, 189.
33. For examples of the use of natural law in constitutional adjudication, see Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that a state's refusal to grant women the right (i.e., a license)
to practice law, does not violate any provision of the U.S. Constitution); see also Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a business has the right to contract the number of hours
an employee will work).
34. Hearings, supra note 1, at 271.
35. Gerhardt, supra note 26, at 981 (quoting Thomas, Higher Law Background at 63-64).
36. Thomas, supra note 29, at 8.
6
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law to constitutional issues. Lehrman's article advocated the criminal-
ization of all abortions as a constitutional matter. The article also
claimed that the theory proclaiming that all abortions are fundamen-
tally unconstitutional was rooted in the language of the Declaration of
Independence.7
However, in responding to the anti-abortion statement during the
hearings, Justice Thomas noted that he was not endorsing Lehrman's
essay when he made the remark. Instead, he explained that he was
attempting to gather support for a civil rights agenda.3 8 Thomas
stated, in essence, that his sole purpose for making the comment was
"to demonstrate to a conservative audience that one of their own
[Lehrman] had used this notion of natural rights.
'39
From these examples, it is apparent that Clarence Thomas sup-
ported the use of natural law in constitutional adjudication. His public
record serves as evidence of that fact. Additionally, the record serves
as evidence of contradictions that would surface throughout the con-
firmation hearings.
B. Abortion
Clarence Thomas also attempted to distance himself from his record
on the abortion issue. At the time of the hearings, the topic was an
extremely controversial issue that had destroyed the nomination of
Judge Robert Bork' and had nearly disrupted the nomination of Jus-
tice Souter. 41 As a result, Justice Thomas made every effort to avoid
the subject. Nevertheless, a confrontation between Justice Thomas
and the abortion issue was inevitable.
During the hearings, when asked whether he had a view on the sub-
ject, Justice Thomas replied:
I think that whether or not I have a view on this important issue is
irrelevant to being an impartial judge and having one could under-
mine or create a perception that could undermine my impartiality.
That is very important to me, and I think it is critical, if not important,
to any judge.4
37. Id.
38. Hearings, supra note 1, at 128.
39. Id. at 353.
40. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (1989) (analyzing
Judge Bork's views towards the confirmation process following his Senate rejection) [hereinafter
Bork]. See also Catherine Pierce Wells, Clarence Thomas: The Invisible Man, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
117-19 (1993) (expressing her opinion of the true political and ideological persona of Justice
Thomas).
41. Wells, supra note 40, at 123 n.20.
42. Hearings, supra note 1, at 262.
7
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When questioned later, however, about the Roe v. Wade43 decision,
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case that legalized abortions, Jus-
tice Thomas commented that he did not have an opinion about the
case. The nominee did note, however, that he was "open-minded on
this issue.""
Upon reviewing Clarence Thomas' statements concerning abortion,
it was found that the nominee had an opinion on the subject: he sup-
ported Lewis Lehrman's essay45 which advocated the criminalization
of all abortions with no exceptions. Additionally, in a report produced
by the White House Working Group on the Family, where Thomas
served as the highest ranking White House official on the task force,
Thomas criticized the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade
and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.4 6 The report criticized as fatally
flawed a line of cases upholding the right of privacy in a woman's right
to an abortion.47 Moreover, the report went as far as to declare that
State-imposed restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion should
not be challenged by the Supreme Court.48
In response to the report, Thomas explained that he had not fully
read the document. Consequently, he was not fully aware of its con-
tents. Furthermore, the nominee noted that if he had read the entire
report, he would have voiced his concerns over the criticism.
C. Civil Rights
Commentators have found Clarence Thomas' views in the area of
civil rights to be somewhat perplexing. Although the nominee has
publicly admitted benefitting from advancements and opportunities
that were made available as a result of the labor of many civil rights
leaders,49 he has nonetheless criticized some of these leaders for their
methods of leadership.5" For example, the nominee once character-
ized the "civil rights community [as] wallowing in self-delusion and
pulling the public with it."
'51
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Hearings, supra note 1, at 294.
45. See Lewis Lehrman, The Declaration of Independence and the Right to Life, AM. SPEC-
TATOR, April 1987, at 21. See Thomas, supra note 29, at 8.
46. 428 U.S. 52 (1975).
47. Hearings, supra note 1, at 184.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 281.
50. See A. Leon Higginbotham, An Open Letter To Justice Clarence Thomas From A Fed-
eral Judicial Colleague, 1006 U. PENN. L. REv. 1005, 1011-20 (1991) (criticizing Justice Thomas
for an ultra-conservative stance on racial issues). See also Juan Williams, EEOC Chairman Blasts
Black Leaders, WASH. POST., Oct. 25, 1984, at A7 (presenting accounts of Thomas' criticisms of
black civil rights leaders).
51. Higginbotham, supra note 50, at 1012 n.21 (quoting Thomas).
8
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In another instance, Justice Thomas has admitted being the benefi-
ciary of the Brown v. Board of Education52 decision, the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court case that struck down segregation in public
schools. Yet, he has criticized the decision for "resting on feelings
rather than reason and moral and political principles.
5 4
In retrospect, Clarence Thomas has benefitted from the fruits of the
civil rights struggle.5 5 Yet, he has remained one of the staunchest crit-
ics of some of its advancements. He has been most harsh in his com-
ments on two advancements in particular: the Voting Rights Act of
196556 and affirmative action.57
When asked during the hearings about his views on voting rights
and affirmative action, Justice Thomas commented that each, to a cer-
tain degree, had its place in American jurisprudence. He stated that
these minority advancements, however, could be detrimental to soci-
ety as a whole if taken too far, e.g., reverse discrimination.
5 8
1. Voting Rights
When questioned during the hearings about his views on the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 59 Justice Thomas expressed his gratitude and loy-
alty to the statute. The nominee stressed that he had "absolutely
nothing but the greatest support for the legislation that secures the
right to vote. '" 60 In addition, Thomas noted, "I do treasure it [the Vot-
ing Rights Act], of course, coming from the background or an area
where that right was considered enormously important and difficult to
secure." 61 Justice Thomas, however, later took exception to certain
aspects of the Act. He stated that when the statute is used to create
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that "separate but equal"
accommodations are constitutional). For an analysis of Plessy, see Loren Miller, Tim PETrION-
ERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 165-82
(1966).
54. Higginbotham, supra note 50, at 1008 n.9 (quoting Thomas).
55. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 108-09. Justice Thomas noted during his personal state-
ment to the Senate Judiciary Committee that he had benefited greatly from the efforts of the
civil rights struggle and its leaders. He stated that but for them, there would have been no road
to travel. He also admitted during the confirmation hearings that his acceptance into Yale was
based on the school's aggressive recruiting of minority students (i.e., an affirmative action plan).
Id. See also supra text accompanying note 3 (contending that Clarence Thomas has been helped
by affirmative action throughout his life).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 (1981). See infra Part II, section C(1) of this comment for examples
of Thomas' comments in this area.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1992). See infra Part II, section C(2) of this comment for exam-
ples of Thomas' comments in this area.
58. Hearings, supra note 1, at 249-51, 262-63.
59. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 makes it illegal for any state to engage in discriminatory
practices to impede a person's right to vote.
60. Hearings, supra note 1, at 411.
61. Id. at 410.
9
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racial stereotypes (e.g., all blacks vote the same) or generalize an indi-
vidual's right to vote, it must be placed back into its proper perspec-
tive, which is to ensure equal voting rights for all, regardless of race.62
Thomas' statement was consistent with his views prior to the hear-
ings. In a 1988 speech at the Tocqueville Forum, the nominee ex-
pressed the same criticism when referring to Supreme Court decisions
that had applied the Voting Rights Act. In this speech, Thomas
stated:
[U]nfortunately, many of the Supreme Court decisions in the area of
voting rights presuppose that blacks, whites, Hispanics, and other eth-
nic groups will inevitably vote in blocs. Instead of looking at the right
to vote as an individual right, the Court has regarded the right as pro-
tected when the individual's racial or ethnic group has sufficient
clout.
63
In another criticism of the Court's application of the Voting Rights
Act, Justice Thomas noted that he also had a problem with the effects
test.' The nominee questioned whether the Court could examine
"how effective[ly] a person's voting rights were being implemented, or
how effective the minorities were in participating in the political pro-
cess" by simply judging the number of individuals who held office.65
The nominee explained that this test [effects test] was only one mea-
sure.' However, he never stated whether other measures were
needed to make such an assessment.
Throughout the discussions on the Voting Rights Act, when he was
asked whether his exception to the effects test and past Supreme
Court decisions would affect his support for the statute, Justice
Thomas replied:
[M]y concerns were not intended to suggest that I was in any way
opposed to voting rights or concerned that we have them. I think that
they are critical, and I certainly have been most supportive and felt
that we should have been more aggressive in stating that position dur-
ing the Reagan years.67
62. Id. at 445-46.
63. Id. at 444-45.
64. Id. at 412.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 411-12.
10
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2. Affirmative Action
68
When questioned during the hearings about his views on affirmative
action,69 Justice Thomas emphasized that he had supported such pro-
grams. He stressed that he understood that racism existed and stated
that "society had an obligation to include those individuals who had
been left out in our society, in the economy, in our schools, our educa-
tional programs, et cetera."7 In addition, the nominee noted that he
had agreed with affirmative action policies that focused on disadvan-
taged minorities and disadvantaged individuals in our society. "We
need to look at all avenues of inclusions,"'" exclaimed Justice Thomas.
The nominee, however, cautioned that if affirmative action was ever
extended too far, whereby it created an equal protection problem
(e.g., it became unfair to members of the "majority" race), the scope
of the program would have to be limited.72
When describing his record on affirmative action, the nominee
stated that he had been "an aggressive advocate of giving minorities
the opportunity and the occasion to develop potential. ' 73 The jurist
referred to his record at EEOC for hiring and promoting minorities,
women, and handicapped employees.
Justice Thomas, however, failed to reveal his negative treatment of
affirmative action. For example, the nominee neglected to disclose
how he once characterized affirmative action as being "offensive '74
even though he had benefitted from such a program when he was ac-
cepted into Yale Law School. In an opinion written by Justice Thomas
when he was on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit that limited the scope of affirmative action policies
in the Federal Communications Commission, he revealed his ap-
proach to affirmative action. In that case, Lamprecht v. FCC,7 5 then-
Judge Thomas held that the FCC's policy of giving preference to wo-
men was unconstitutional because "it simply is not reasonable... that
granting preferences to women will increase programming diver-
68. Affirmative action programs are employment programs required by federal statutes and
regulations designed to remedy discriminatory practices in hiring minority group members; i.e.
positive steps designed to eliminate existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering
effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future
discrimination. BLACK'S, supra note 30, at 59.
69. Affirmative action programs originated in the federal government as a result of a 1961
executive order by President Kennedy (popularly known as the "Affirmative Action Order").
Samuel Starks, Note, Understanding Government Affirmative Action and Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 41 Duin L.J. 933, 937 (1992). See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965).
70. Hearings, supra note 1, at 301.
71. Id. at 363.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 361.
74. Gerhardt, supra note 26, at 979.
75. 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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sity."76 He found that the government failed to show that its sex-pref-
erence policy was substantially related to achieving diversity on the
airwaves.
Critics state that the only reason Justice Thomas may not have re-
vealed his negative treatment of such policies could have been an ef-
fort to secure a seat on the Court. In fact, it was reported in the New
York Times that then-Judge Thomas had purposely delayed the re-
lease of the Lamprecht decision so as not to imperil his nomination.78
Justice Thomas denied the report.79 Regardless of whether the nomi-
nee delayed the report or not, this incident serves as yet another con-
tradiction made by him during the hearings.
D. Prisoners' Rights
During the hearings, Justice Thomas expressed his views on prison-
ers' rights. This line of questioning was the least controversial subject
discussed during the hearings, partly because the nominee had a
somewhat clean slate on the topic. During Thomas' testimony, he
spoke of preserving the rights of criminal defendants, especially those
who faced the death penalty. He stated that the irreversible punish-
ment was "the harshest penalty that could be imposed."'8  Conse-
quently, he felt that society "should be most concerned about
providing all the rights and all the due process that can be provided
and should be provided to individuals who may face that kind of a
consequence.
81
Indeed, it did appear that Clarence Thomas was an advocate of pris-
oners' rights given his testimony at the hearings. The nominee ex-
pressed both compassion and understanding for the criminal
defendants. Unfortunately, the compassion the nominee possessed
during the hearings did not surface when the Justice confronted pris-
oners' rights issues during his first term on the Court.
76. Id. at 385. "It is not reasonable to expect that a woman would manifest a distinctly
female view." Id. See also Neil A. Lewis, Appeals-Court Ruling by Thomas Limits FCC Affirm-
ative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at Al.
77. Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 385.
78. Neil A. Lewis, Appeals-Court Ruling by Thomas Limits FCC Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 20, 1992, at Al.
79. Id
80. Hearings, supra note 1, at 133.
81. Id.
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E. Sexual Harassment'
The sexual harassment issue was the most controversial topic dis-
cussed during the confirmation hearings. All other subjects paled in
comparison. The controversy, however, did not focus on the nomi-
nee's views concerning the topic. Instead, the dispute centered
around sexual harassment allegations against the nominee by a former
employee. 3
Professor Anita F. Hill,84 a former assistant to Clarence Thomas,
charged that the nominee had harassed her during his tenure at the
Department of Education and later at EEOC. This allegation subse-
quently created a media frenzy, which resulted in Anita Hill being
summoned to publicly testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee
and the nation.85 This allegation, unfortunately, also forced Anita Hill
to confront Clarence Thomas and the men who would later confirm
him as a Supreme Court Justice!'
During what was termed as the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hear-
ings, Professor Hill described the abuse she suffered at the hands of
the nominee.87 She noted that she had repeatedly asked Justice
Thomas to discontinue his sexual innuendos towards her. She stated
that the nominee simply ignored her plea. As a result, Professor Hill
revealed, she suffered from severe stress which resulted in her hospi-
talization for acute stomach pain. She also disclosed that the harass-
ment resulted in her decision to find employment elsewhere.'n
In responding to the allegations, Justice Thomas declared his inno-
cence. He stated that he had not sexually harassed Professor Hill or
anyone else at anytime while he was at the Department of Education
and EEOC. Thomas explained:
82. Sexual harassment, as a type of employment discrimination, includes sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature prohibited by
federal law and commonly by state statutes. BLACK'S, supra note 30, at 1375.
83. The sexual harassment charges were leaked to Timothy Phelps of Newsday and Nina
Totenberg of National Public Radio. Gerber, supra note 8, at 117.
84. Anita Hill is currently a tenured Professor of Law at the University of Oklahoma.
85. See Anita Hill and the Senate's Duty, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. 8, 1991, at A24; See also Susan
Estrich, Forced to be Fair, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 9, 1991, at A25; Anna Quindlen, Listen to Us, N.Y.
TimFs, Oct. 9, 1991, at A25; Proper Hearing, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 10, 1991, at A26.
86. For an interesting insight into the aftermath of the hearings, see Voter Revolt: A Giant-
Killer in Illinois, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 1992, at 38; Bill Turque, Arlen Specter's Specter, NEws-
WEEK, Apr. 27, 1992, at 31.
87. Professor Hill recalled how Justice Thomas had occasionally described "pornographic
materials depicting individuals with large penises and large breasts involving various sex acts."
She also disclosed how he occasionally referred to the size of his own penis as being larger than
normal. In addition, she revealed that the nominee had several times graphically given accounts
of his own sexual prowess (for instance, how he gave pleasure to women by performing oral sex).
Hearings, supra note 1, at 37.
88. Itd
13
Bell: Clarence Thomas: Evasive or Deceptive
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1995
19951 CLARENCE THOMAS: EVASIVE OR DECEPTIVE 207
[D]uring my tenure in the executive branch, as a manager, as a policy
maker and as a person, I have adamantly condemned sex harassment.
There is no member of this [c]ommittee or this Senate who feels
stronger about sex harassment than I do. As a manager, I make every
effort to take swift and decisive action when sex harassment raised or
reared its ugly head.
89
In fact, the nominee noted that while at EEOC, he had played an
extensive role in the development of legal arguments in a sexual har-
assment case.90
Justice Thomas later commented that he did not know why Anita
Hill made such allegations against him. He noted that "had any state-
ments or conduct [on his part] been brought to [his] attention, [he]
would have remembered it clearly because of the nature and serious-
ness of such conduct, as well as [his] adamant opposition to sex dis-
crimination and sexual harassment." 91 "But there were no such
statements," proclaimed Clarence Thomas.'
Whether to believe the nominee or Anita Hill created a strong up-
roar in this country. Indeed, the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas hearings
had divided the nation. As one commentator insightfully noted,
"What you saw depended on who you were." 93 Unfortunately, the
hearings took the focus off of Clarence Thomas' views and placed it
on his character.94
PART III - CASES
Abortion
When asked about his views on abortion, Justice Thomas declined
to give a definitive answer. He stated that he believed in an individ-
ual's right to privacy and a couple's right to procreate. 95 Moreover,
Justice Thomas asserted that he had no quarrel with following prece-
dent in this area, such as Roe v. Wade.' However, despite repeated
efforts by Senators to have the nominee specifically state his position
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 442.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id. at 7.
93. Gerber, supra note 8, at 117 (quoting from Emma Coleman Jordan, Race, Gender, and
Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The Hidden Fault Lines in Political
Discourse, 15 HA~v. WomEN's L.J. 1 (1992)).
94. It is the author's opinion that Justice Thomas' character had already been flawed by the
many contradictions throughout the hearings, as evidenced by facts contained in Part II of this
comment.
95. Hearings, supra note 1, at 277, 394.
96. Id. at 462. Senator Metzenbaum reminded Judge Thomas of some of his writings and
statements concerning the reversal of Roe v. Wade.
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on abortion, Justice Thomas refused to comment on the topic even
though his public record suggested that he was a pro-life advocate. 7
Although Justice Thomas refused to disclose his position on abor-
tion during the confirmation hearings, his view became apparent in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic98 and Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.99 In Bray, the Court reversed the convictions of anti-abor-
tion protestors who were found guilty of conspiring to deprive women
access to abortion clinics, a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).100
Joining in the majority's opinion, Justice Thomas held that the first
clause of section 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action
against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Also, the clinic
had not shown that opposition to abortions qualified alongside race
discrimination as an "otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus [underlying] the conspirators' action."'' 1 Finally, the clinic
had not shown that the protestors "aimed at interfering with rights"
that were "protected against private, as well as official encroach-
ment," a second prerequisite to proving a private conspiracy in viola-
tion of § 1985(3). 102
In a 5-4 decision, the Casey Court upheld the right of women to
have an abortion, as held in Roe v. Wade. The majority, however,
placed restrictions on that privilege. It held that the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania had the right to require, among other things,
mandatory counseling, a waiting period of twenty-four hours, and ju-
dicial or parental permission if the patient is a minor. The Court also
held that these limitations did not cause any "undue hardship" upon
the woman's ability to have the procedure.
Justice Thomas, joining the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, stated that the Roe decision was decided incorrectly when
it held that the right to purposely terminate the potential life of a fetus
was fundamental. In Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice Thomas sup-
ported the conclusion that a woman's decision to abort her unborn
child was not a constitutionally protected 'liberty' because "(1) the
Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding
traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally
proscribed."' 3
97. See Thomas Praised Anti-Roe Essay, Mitm H-REAL, July 3, 1991, at Al.
98. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
99. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."
101. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
102. Id
103. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874.
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In Bray and Casey, Justice Thomas' support of the majority and dis-
sents, respectively, clearly revealed his pro-life position on the issue of
abortion.104
Civil Rights
In Shaw v. Reno'0 5 and Presley v. Etowah County Commission,"°6
Justice Thomas stood by his position on the issue of voting rights.
Joining in the majority opinion in Shaw, Thomas held that a plaintiff
challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection
Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-
neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other
than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race and that separation lacked sufficient justification. °7
In Presley, Thomas joined in the opinion of the majority to limit the
scope of the Voting Rights. Act. In this decision, the majority upheld
Etowah County's decision to shift the power of its commissioners (to
authorize road repairs) to an appointed commission when a black can-
didate was elected to the Board. In reaching this decision, the Court
reasoned that "(1) section 5 [of the Act did] not cover changes other
than changes in rules governing voting, and (2) [that] neither change
in question effected change in rules governing voting such that
preclearance was required."'" 8
In Presley, Justice Thomas illustrated his position regarding the ap-
plication of the Voting Rights Act in "all aspects" of the voting
arena.'" 9 In that decision, he allowed the manipulating of the posi-
tions for which the candidates were elected.
In Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville,"' Justice
Thomas also stood by his position on affirmative action. In that case,
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the majority which struck down
an affirmative action program that set aside a certain percentage of
government contracts for minority businesses. In ruling on this case,
the majority stated:
104. For an interesting analysis of the effects of Casey, see Mark H. Woltz, Note, A Bold
Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens the Door for States to Enact New Laws to
Discourage Abortion, 71 N.C.L. REV. 1787 (1993).
105. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
106. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
107. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824.
108. Presley, 502 U.S. at 491. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires a covered
jurisdiction to obtain either judicial or administrative preclearance before enforcing any new
"voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting." Id. at 2820. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1965).
109. See Linda Greenhouse, In Retreat, Supreme Court Limits Scope of '65 Voting Rights Act,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 28,1992, at Al.
110. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
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When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but
for the barrier in order to establish standing."'
In sum, Justice Thomas stated that in order to bring a suit, a plaintiff
did not have to prove that he could have won the contract had it not
been for the affirmative action program." 2
In both Shaw and Northeastern Florida, the plaintiffs did not have
to show an injury-in-fact. 113 The Court created a new cause of action
by allowing members of the majority race to bring equal protection
claims merely by showing a hypothetical injury or risk of injury.'14
Prisoners' Rights
During the hearings, Justice Thomas displayed compassion and un-
derstanding for criminal defendants. He stated that every step should
be taken to insure that their rights are afforded to them. However, in
Hudson v. McMillian"15 and Helling v. McKinney," 6 Justice Thomas
took a different position. In Hudson, a prisoner sued prison officials
for violating his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment. In this case, two prison guards attacked an inmate while
he was handcuffed and shackled and while their supervisor looked on
and commented "not to have too much fun.""' 7 The assault on the
inmate resulted in minor bruises and swelling of the face, mouth, and
lip; loose teeth; and a cracked dental plate. The Court, in a 7-2 deci-
sion, held that the "beating" violated the prisoner's rights. It stated
that the use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute cruel
111. Id. at 2303.
112. For an interesting look into the racial aspect of affirmative action, see Frederick A.
Morton, Jr., Classed-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of America Denying the Im-
pact of Race, 45 RuTGERS L. REV. 1089 (1993) (discussing how the conservative Supreme Court
has, in a number of decisions, made it considerably more difficult for plaintiffs challenging dis-
criminatory practices).
113. See United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (holding that the
Constitution did not prevent a state that is subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately
creating or preserving black majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its reappor-
tionment plan complied with sec. 5); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that a
plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific, concrete facts
demonstrating that such practices harmed him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible
way from the Court's intervention).
114. For an interesting discussion on the aftermath of the Shaw decision, see Symposium,
The Future of Voting Rights After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993). See also Hays v.
Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993) (this case was based on the Shaw decision).
115. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
116. 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993).
117. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6.
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and unusual punishment even though the inmate does not suffer seri-
ous injury.11
In the dissent, Justice Thomas, along with Justice Scalia, held that
the majority went far beyond precedents in reaching its decision. He
noted that the inmate's injuries were indeed "minor." 119
In Helling, a prisoner again sued prison officials for violating his
Eighth Amendment rights after he was exposed to environmental to-
bacco smoke (ETS). The Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that such a
cause of action could arise because of the possible future harm to
health as well as present harm to the inmate due to the exposure.1
2 0
In the dissent, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia again held that the
majority had extended the prohibition too far. In sum, Clarence
Thomas stated that the Court's holding was "unacceptable" because it
had created a cause of action for a "mere risk of injury. "121
In Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,122 a Spanish-speaking Cuban prisoner
sought to have his conviction overturned through habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. The inmate alleged that his plea of nolo contendere to first-
degree manslaughter was without his full knowledge and consent be-
cause he did not fully understand the mens rea element of the crime.
Moreover, he contended that when this issue was brought on appeal,
post-conviction counsel neglected to develop crucial facts surrounding
his inability to understand the crime.
Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion which held that an
evidentiary hearing was proper only if Tamayo-Reyes could show
cause for his failure to develop the facts [about his interpretation of
the mens rea element as explained by an interpretator] in state-court
proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. 123 The
majority also held that "[f]ederal courts [were] no longer obliged to
grant a hearing on a state prisoner's challenge to his conviction, even
if the prisoner [could] show that his lawyer had not properly presented
crucial facts of the case in a state-court appeal."' 24
In Keeney, the majority restricted habeas corpus proceedings and
practically eliminated a criminal defendant's right to effective assist-
ance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, thus reflecting Clar-
ence Thomas' position on this issue.
Justice Thomas' position in both Helling and Hudson do not coin-
cide with the remarks he once made about how moved he would get
118. Id. at 12.
119. Id. at 45.
120. Helling, 113 S. Ct. at 2481.
121. Id. at 2482.
122. 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
123. 1& at 17.
124. COURT OF APPEAL, supra note 2, at xxxix.
18
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 [1995], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol21/iss2/3
212 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:194
every time he saw a busload of young black men being transported to
the courthouse because "but for the grace of God," he could have
been on that bus. 125 Indeed, Justice Thomas' positions in these cases
were harsh. Justice O'Connor, in her opinion in Hudson, stated:
[T]he dissent's argument that excessive force claims and conditions of
confinement claims are no different in kind is likewise un-
founded... To deny the difference between punching a prisoner in the
face and serving him unappetizing food is to ignore the concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency that animate the
Eighth Amendment. 26
Justice Thomas' position in these two cases provoked the New York
Times to crown him "the youngest and the cruelest justice.'
'1 27
Sexual Harassment
Throughout the hearings, Clarence Thomas declared his hatred and
condemnation for sex discrimination and sexual harassment. When
faced with his first case involving this issue, the Justice's position was
not as adamant. In Franklin v. Gwinnet County Public School,"2 a
teenaged girl sued the school system for condoning sexual harassment
by failing to protect her from the sexual advancements of her teacher.
In an unanimous decision, the Court held that Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972129 was enforceable through an implied right
of action and that monetary damages were allowed. However, Justice
Thomas, joining the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, concluded
that since the right to sue under this Act was "judicially" implied, the
scope of relief should be implied as well. 30 Consequently, the reme-
dies afforded under this Act should be limited.
In Landgraf v. USI Film Product,'31 Justice Thomas, joining in the
concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, again attempted to limit the reach
of remedies afforded to a victim. In that case, he held that section 102
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991132 did not apply to a Title VII case that
was pending on appeal when the Act was enacted. Thus, a plaintiff
125. Hearings, supra note 1, at 480. It appears from the dissents in the prisoners' rights cases
that Justice Thomas had lost all sense of compassion and understanding that he expressed for
prisoners during the confirmation hearings.
126. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 17-18.
127. See The Youngest, Cruelest Justice, N.Y. Tumls, Feb. 27, 1992, at A24.
128. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
129. Title IX in pertinent part prohibits any type of verbal or physical conduct that amounts
to sexual harassment in the workplace. See 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-88 (1972).
130. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 31, 32.
131. 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994).
132. Section 102 in pertinent part prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and it pro-
vides an adequate means of relief for any violation of this Act. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)
(1991).
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was denied equitable relief for the harassment she suffered at the
hands of her former employer.
In another sexual harassment suit, Justice Thomas did advance the
fight against such conduct by lowering the standard upon which a
cause of action may exist. In Harris v. Forklift,1 3 3 petitioner sued her
former employer for creating an "abusive work environment" 134 in vi-
olation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.131 The Court, in a
unanimous decision, held that Title VII is violated when the work-
place is permeated with discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to create a discriminatorily hostile or abusive
working environment 3 6 and concluded that to be actionable as abu-
sive work environment harassment, the conduct need not "seriously
affect [an employee's] psychological well-being" or lead the plaintiff
to "suffer injury.'
'1 37
In assessing Justice Thomas' position concerning sexual harassment,
his opinions were indeed conflicting. In Franklin and Landgraf, the
Justice attempted to limit or restrict the remedies available to a person
who brings suit alleging sexual misconduct. On the other hand, the
Harris decision opened the door to victims who may have been shut
out because of the rigid "abusive environment" standard.
138
PART IV - CLARENCE THOMAS: EVASIVE OR DECEPTIVE
Throughout the confirmation hearings, Clarence Thomas was found
to be ambiguous and vague with respect to his responses to inquiries
by the Senate Judiciary Committee.' 39 Whenever the nominee was
presented with a key concern, he either side-stepped the question or
refused to specifically address the matter on the ground that his an-
swer would affect his impartiality as a Supreme Court Justice.' 40
When confronted with past comments or writings, Justice Thomas
merely brushed them aside as misquotes or statements taken out of
context.
141
133. 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
134. For an analysis of the abusive work environment standard, see Meritor v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986).
135. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "unlawful employment practice for an
employer.. .to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
136. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 370.
137. Id. at 371.
138. Consequently, the author must withhold judgment on Justice Thomas with respect to
this issue.
139. See Neil A. Lewis, Thomas Ends Testimony but Senators Grumble over Elusive Views,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at A14.
140. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 181.
141. See supra Part II of this perspective for detailed examples.
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When examining Clarence Thomas' "statements" during the confir-
mation hearings, it is apparent that the nominee had an opinion or
view as to many of the topics discussed (e.g., abortion, affirmative ac-
tion, voting rights, and natural law) but his views were not always
clearly expressed to the Senate Judiciary Committee. This can be seen
from the recent Supreme Court decisions over which Justice Thomas
presided. His statements during the hearing were not consistent with
his position in these Supreme Court opinions. Thus, in comparing the
testimony of Clarence Thomas during the hearings to his past
speeches and contemporaneous decisions, one question should come
to mind: Were Clarence Thomas' answers to the Senate's inquiries
merely evasive or unscrupulously deceptive?
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